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In his paper "Why a Class Can't Change Its Members," Richard Sharvy appears to establish the impossibility of the existence of a variable class— that is, a class that at one time has a member that is not a member of it at another time. I first indicate the importance of Sharvy's argument for our understanding of the concept of identity in the contexts of time and modality, and I summarize his argument. Sharvy says that a class C that has one (non-variable) group of members at t1 and another (nonvariable) group of members at t2 would be identical with both the class C1 that always has the first group as members and the class C2 that always has the second group as members. This is an impossibility, since in general, one thing cannot be identical with two. I then criticize Sharvy's argument by pointing out a weakness in the defense of the claim that C = C1 and C = C2. This weakness is due to an ambiguity in Sharvy's Principle of Extensionality.
Variable Classes

Rarely do arguments in metaphysics extinguish doubt, even concerning the least important issues. Richard Sharvy* appeared to have given us one of those rare arguments when he attempted to establish the impossibility of the existence of a variable class--that is, a class that at one time has a member that is not a member of it at another time. The issue seems minor, since even if there are variable classes, a logician can, if he so desires, confine his researches to the non-variable ones. However, Sharvy's paper has significance even for those who do not crave metaphysical proofs. By concentrating on the relatively clear concept of a class in the context of identity through time, the concepts of identity and change are more sharply focused as well. This can at least help us avoid errors when these concepts are applied to objects less well understood than classes are, and it may lead to positive results as well. If it can be shown that there is no class of Supreme Court members that is at one time the class of 1965 Supreme Court members and at another time the class of 1975 Supreme Court members, then this may lead to the acceptance of principles that justify claiming that there is no President of the U.S. who is at one time the 1965 President of the U.S. and at another time the 1975 President of the U.S.

Furthermore, when the argument is applied to modality rather than time--and Sharvy does make this move--its conclusion is that there is no world-variable class--no class that has a member that is not a member of it in every world. In other words, if m is a member of S, then necessarily m is a member of S. Since knowledge of class membership is often not a priori, this implies that one may know that necessarily m is a member of S without knowing a priori that m is a member of S. There are of course many purported cases of non-a priori knowledge of necessities. Assuming that personhood is an essential property, and given our a posteriori knowledge that Gloria Steinem is a person, then we know that necessarily if Steinem exists, she is a person. However, in all such examples, the essentialist assumption remains undefended by argument. Heretofore, only in the case of identities and God’s existence have we been presented with anything like a proof. Now Sharvy has added class membership to the list.

It may seem that the membership relation could be shown to be essential, at least for some cases, even if there are world-variable classes. The "some cases" would be just the non-world-variable classes. Indeed, this is completely correct, but it vitiates the interest of Sharvy’s argument only if there are undisputed examples of non-world-variable classes where membership in the classes is never known a priori. We know that necessarily 2 is a member of the non-world-variable class of prime numbers, but this knowledge is (characteristically) a priori if any knowledge is. We do not know a priori that Steinem is a member of the class of persons, but it is just such a class that would be world-variable if any class is. 

There appear to be at most two sorts of examples of the classes we seek. First, there is the class of all possible persons, the class of all persons in @ (where “@” names the actual world), and the like. For example, if one accepts that it is not known a priori that Steinem is a member of the class of all possible persons; and one accepts that if she is a possible person, then she is necessarily a possible person; then it follows that one can have non-a priori knowledge of the necessary truth that Steinem is a member of the class of all possible persons. Even if the questionable premises of this argument are accepted, however, the membership relation would be shown to be essential only when the criterion for membership is specified in modal terms. Secondly, there are examples such as the class whose sole members are Seiji Ozawa and Michael Tilson Thomas, assuming that only one possible entity could be Ozawa, and similarly for Thomas. This is a more interesting sort of class, but it may be disputed whether membership in classes of this sort is never known a priori. Do we know a priori that Ozawa is a member of {Ozawa, Thomas}? It only seems not, because to know that Ozawa is a member of {Ozawa, Thomas} we need the apparently non-a priori knowledge that Ozawa exists and also that he is not an object such as the universal class, which (under the standard conception) is not a member of any class. But this is dubious because it begins to strain the notoriously nebulous concept of a priori knowledge. We look to Sharvy for clearer cases. 

Because of its significance and persuasiveness, it is important to note a weakness in Sharvy*s reasoning. Sharvy’s argument is that a class C that has one (non-variable) group of members at t1 and another (non-variable) group of members at t2 would be identical with both the class that always has the first group as members and the class that always has the second group as members. This is an impossibility, since in general, one thing cannot be identical with two. The weakness lies in the defense of the claim that C = C1 and C = C2. Sharvy uses the Principle of Extensionality:

A class x is identical with a class y if and only if x and y have the same members. 

But does this assert that (i) a class x is identical with a class y if and only if x and y now have the same members, or does it assert that (ii) a class x is identical with a class y if and only if x and y always have the same members as one another? Since C and C1 have the same members at t1, and (i) is true, they are identical. Similarly for C and C2. Thus, the argument requires (i), and this can be denied while (ii) (or perhaps a "tenseless" version) does all the work that everyone wants the Principle of Extensionality to do. Applied to modality, the argument assumes that a class x is identical with a class y if and only if x and y possibly (as opposed to necessarily or "modelessly") have the same members.

The weakness, therefore, is the lack of support for (i). Indeed, one can argue against it by beginning with the somewhat natural assumption that the Supreme Court is a class; noting that it does change its members; then finding another class with the same members the Supreme Court now has, but which does not change its members; and so inferring that (i) is false. Perhaps some people want to show there are no variable classes because they find them messy; they complicate matters too much. Such people should have pointed out to them the following consequence of the impossibility of variable classes, a consequence they may also consider untidy. Presumably there are classes such that at some time none of their members exist. If a class cannot change its members, then either these classes do not always exist or things can have properties (such as the property of being a member of a certain class) when they do not exist. Lots of people dislike the second disjunct (though admittedly many do not), and if you are completely content with the first one, then ask yourself this question: If classes come and go along with their members, when does a class whose members include Napoleon and Cleopatra exist? That is, when do classes whose members never coexist exist?

*Richard Sharvy, "Why a Class Can't Change Its Members," Nous, II (1968): 303-314. For a discussion motivating concern regarding the variable President, see Sharvy, "Things," Monist (1969): 488-504.
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